Engaging Marginalized Groups in Peace, Security, and Democratic Resilience Programming: New Ways Forward

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ABSTRACT

This report was researched and written on behalf of the National Democratic Institute (NDI) by a team of University of Minnesota students as part of the Master's degree curriculum at the Humphrey School of Public Affairs. The report covers two sub-sections of NDI's Peace, Security and Democratic Resilience portfolio: bridging intergroup division and democratic governance of the security sector, and explores ways in which NDI can make their programming more inclusive of marginalized groups (religious and ethnic minorities, indigenous people, LGBTI populations, persons with disabilities, and youth). Each topic section consists of a literature review, followed by a review of relevant programming, and specific case study analyses from NDI's own work. This is followed by recommendations for NDI on a number of ways in which its programming can be more inclusive based on the preceding research. The report closes with suggested paths forward, and new areas for NDI to explore.

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INTRODUCTION

The National Democratic Institute (NDI) aims to strengthen democratic practices, civil society, and governance through programming. Organizations like NDI that focus on building democracy across the world have recognized that inclusion of marginalized groups is a vital component of effective programming that aims to reach vulnerable communities. This report was completed by four Humphrey School of Public Affairs graduate students at the University of Minnesota as part of a capstone project. Our goal is to identify best practices for the inclusion of marginalized populations in two of NDI's programming areas: bridging intergroup divisions and democratic governance of the security sector. These two areas are part of NDI's recently developed peace, security, and democratic resilience (PSDR) portfolio. There are two other programming areas in the PSDR portfolio that will not be addressed in this report for the sake of depth: electoral violence and post-conflict transitions. Marginalized groups are defined by NDI as youth, religious and ethnic minorities, indigenous peoples, LGBTI communities, and persons with disabilities (PWD). It should be noted that gender is not a focus of this report, but it is still part of NDI's work with marginalized populations. While inclusion of marginalized populations is not a new working area for NDI, this report focuses on the intersection of PSDR and inclusion to identify, assess, and recommend program approaches relating to marginalized groups. Our team understands that NDI would like to mainstream the inclusion of marginalized populations into its already existing programs rather than creating targeted programming.

The report is divided into five main parts. The first part explains the methodology we used to conduct our research. The second and third parts discuss bridging intergroup divisions and democratic governance of the security sector, respectively, in parallel formats. Each section begins with a literature review in which we analyze the academic and policy literature on the subjects. Specifically, we look at the causes of and remedies for intergroup divisions and theoretical and practical analyses of democratic governance of the security sector. Then, in the subsections titled "Programming Review," we report on programming being conducted by other organizations that incorporate marginalized communities in bridging intergroup divisions and democratic governance of the security sector. Lastly, we analyze current or past NDI programming in the form of case studies and make recommendations for additional ways marginalized populations can be incorporated, accompanied by related resources. The fourth part of the report looks at general resources that can be applied to both bridging intergroup divisions and democratic governance of the security sector, and the fifth and final part is the report conclusion.

METHODOLOGY

The research presented in this report was carried out using qualitative methods and non-scientific sampling. We reviewed existing scholarly literature, sought out information on similar or related programming carried out by other leading organizations, and interviewed NDI staff members engaged in programming in a select group of countries recommended to us by NDI's Senior Program Officer for Citizen Participation and Inclusion.

To begin our research process, we conducted a literature review of top-ranked scholarly journals using Google Scholar and the University of Minnesota's library database to identify relevant theories and practices of inclusion of marginalized groups in the areas of bridging intergroup divisions and democratic governance of the security sector. Our team prioritized using peer-reviewed sources in order to ensure the report provided well-researched and widely established information in these fields. According to the SCImago Journal & Country Rank database, 70% of the journals we used are in the first quartile ranking for journal influence, and the remaining 30% are in the second quartile ranking, which indicates the sources we used are of high academic rigor.

We identified existing non-NDI programming and resources, such as toolkits, on the inclusion of marginalized populations in the PSDR realm through Google searches and using the prior knowledge of our team. This proved challenging at times as the terminology employed by NDI is not always shared by scholars and other organizations, particularly the phrase "democratic governance of the security sector." In that case, after discussing the history of democratic governance of the security sector, we developed wider search terms such as "civil-military relations" and "civilian oversight of the military" combined with various phrasings of marginalized populations to yield greater research results. Some of the organizations we looked at included International Crisis Group, Alliance for Peacebuilding, and Search for Common Ground.

We also searched for examples of other relevant resources and programming conducted or funded by major donors, such as USAID and the United Nations. In doing so we assessed how their approaches might have been informed by theory and explored other approaches to the problem of inclusion of marginalized communities in programming for democratic resilience. We found that while donors do not generally refer to theories by name, it is apparent that scholarly research continues to influence their interests and the creation of peace, security, and democratic resilience programs. We contacted some of the aforementioned organizations directly in an attempt to gather further information about their programming but had limited success.

Halfway through our research process we were given access to internal NDI documents for programs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Central African Republic, and the Sahel (Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger) as case studies in order to assess how NDI currently addresses questions related to the inclusion of marginalized populations in the PSDR areas of bridging intergroup divisions and democratic governance of the security sector. We also had phone interviews with NDI personnel from each program, each lasting approximately one-hour in length, in order to obtain further background information and ask clarifying questions. These interviews were instrumental in framing the way we approached the case studies, as we sought to provide

information that would be useful to the program officer based on their assessment of their program's strengths and areas for improvement.

The following section is an in-depth analysis of the PSDR issue area of bridging intergroup divisions. Following this section will be a similarly-formatted analysis of democratic governance of the security sector. The final two sections will include resources that can be used in programming for both issue areas and the report conclusion.

BRIDGING INTERGROUP DIVISIONS

Social cohesion is a vital characteristic of democratic societies. Conflict between groups is driven by many factors, and intergroup divisions present particular challenges for democratic practices as they directly interfere with a society's ability to be cohesive and function democratically. Intergroup divisions that are caused by lack of resources, differences in religious and ethnic identities, political tensions, and other identity factors can inflict lasting harms on societies, impeding them from moving toward more inclusive democratic practices. Given the importance of social cohesion, NDI's efforts to reduce intergroup divisions is a vital aspect of the organization's programs in deeply divided societies. In order to help inform NDI's efforts to bridge intergroup divisions, we conducted a literature review on theories of intergroup conflict and programming of other organizations working on reducing intergroup divisions. For a list of recommended resources and further reading on these theories, please refer to Appendix B.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Theories of Intergroup Relations

The scholarly literature available on theories of intergroup divisions is mostly attributed to the research of social psychologists. Throughout our research, we observed that scholars tended to focus on the general issue of intergroup conflict rather than on specific marginalized populations within the problem of intergroup conflict. Furthermore, scholars approached the problem from a theoretical rather than a programmatic perspective. There is an extensive body of literature on theories of intergroup conflict more generally, however, as demonstrated by the existence of important online scholarly collections such as the Oxford Handbook of Intergroup Conflict.[1]

Among this wide range of theoretical literature, we were able to identify several theories that could aid in the understanding of intergroup divisions in the development of democratic practices. These theories will be particularly helpful in developing programming that fosters the political inclusion of marginalized populations and builds democratic resilience. Many of these theories have been widely researched in the field of social psychology by prominent scholars such as social psychologist Muzafer Sherif, psychologist Gordon Allport, and social scientist Donald Campbell. The theories appear in order of our perceived relevance to NDI and include: intergroup contact theory; realistic conflict theory; system justification theory; social dominance theory; social identity theory; and the concepts of scope of justice, moral exclusion/inclusion, and consideration for future consequences.

Our team identified ***intergroup contact theory*** as a particularly relevant approach for NDI to consider in its bridging intergroup divisions programming. Intergroup contact theory primarily suggests that direct contact between groups can foster mutual understanding and reduce prejudice, and therefore aid the democratic process. It was developed by Gordon Allport in the 1950s, and contains four basic necessary components for its application: equal status between

[1] Linda R. Tropp, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Intergroup Conflict* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199747672.001.0001

groups; cooperation; common goals; and support by social and institutional authorities.[2] Proponents of this theory assert that "intergroup bias can be substantially reduced via positive encounters between members of different groups."[3] Application of this theory to conflict situations has been shown to improve intergroup relations through identification of commonalities between groups. For example, two different groups sharing a common goal can reduce bias as they begin to see important aspects of their lives as interrelated with one another. Social psychology research on intergroup contact theory thus focuses on developing a common, "superordinate identity" among groups, such as a shared national identity, which can bring different groups together to work toward a common goal that benefits all.[4] Although this theory emphasizes the importance of creating this "superordinate identity," other research has shown that it is important for each group to maintain their respective identities.[5] This theory is also relevant to the scholarly discussion about incorporating marginalized groups into democratic governance processes, examined below.

One criticism of intergroup contact theory is that it may lead to marginalized populations undermining "attention to inequality and collective action" on behalf of their own groups.[6] That is, focusing on commonalities among groups can foster unrealistically optimistic perspectives from marginalized or disadvantaged groups, which can lead to a "decrease in motivation for social change."[7] Furthermore, it is likely that disadvantaged groups will resist being assimilated into a majority outgroup.[8] That is, if the "superordinate identity" described above is dominated by a majority group following intergroup contact, then marginalized groups may not feel that they benefit from such an identity.[9] As such, programming that employs this theory should take precautions to follow the conditions posited by Allports original formulation of contact theory, mentioned in the above paragraph.

Another widely studied theory of intergroup conflict is ***realistic conflict theory***. This theory posits that intergroup conflict, biases, and antagonism is primarily caused by competition for finite resources.[10] Developed by social scientist Donald Campbell and further examined by social psychologist Muzafer Sherif and his colleagues in the 1960s, it has since become a major theory used to explain intergroup conflict. According to this theory, "intergroup hostility is produced by the existence of conflicting goals (i.e., competition) and reduced by the existence of mutually desired superordinate goals attainable only through intergroup cooperation."[11] These "superordinate goals" are defined by Sherif as objectives that appeal to

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[2] Jim A.C. Everett, "Intergroup Contact Theory: Past, Present, and Future," *The Inquisitive Mind,* Issue 17, 2013, 2, http://www.in-mind.org/article/intergroup-contact-theory-past-present-and-future
[3] Tamar Saguy et al., "The Irony of Harmony: Past and New Developments," in *Intergroup Contact Theory: Recent Developments and Future Directions,* ed. Loris Vezzali and Sofia Stathi (New York: Routledge, 2017), 53.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid., 54.
[6] Ibid., 55.
[7] Ibid., 58.
[8] Shelley McKeown, "Perceptions of a Superordinate Identity in Northern Ireland," *Peace and Conflict* vol. 20, no. 4, (2014), 506. http://dx.doi.org.ezp3.lib.umn.edu/10.1037/pac0000051
[9] Ibid.
[10] Janet Ward Schofield, "Realistic Group Conflict Theory," in *Encyclopedia of Group Processes and Intergroup Relations,* ed. John M. Levine and Michael A. Hogg (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, Inc., 2010), 2. http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781412972017.n208
[11] Jay W. Jackson, "Realistic group conflict theory: A review and evaluation of the theoretical and empirical literature," *Psychological Record* 43, no. 3 (Summer 1993).

more than one group and can only be achieved through cooperative means.[12] This is directly related to the "superordinate identity" described in the discussion of intergroup contact theory. This theory could thus be continuously referred to in programming to bridge intergroup divisions in conjunction with intergroup contact theory. A criticism of realistic conflict theory is that often, intergroup conflict arises from unequal power and status between groups, and that superordinate goals are thus difficult to establish in these cases.[13] This is similar to the criticisms of intergroup contact theory, where marginalized groups may not necessarily see the benefit in formulating superordinate identities or goals if those things are dominated by majority groups with more power and status. Furthermore, realistic conflict theory does not take into account the influence of third parties in ameliorating intergroup divisions.[14]

System justification theory was developed in an attempt to fuse the Marxist idea of false consciousness with philosophical and social scientific theories, and is particularly applicable to marginalized populations. Proponents of this theory aim to explain why groups maintain support for the current social and economic systems, and suggest that the degree to which marginalized groups view economic and social systems in place as legitimate and "fair" determines the amount of these groups' support for the status quo.[15] In relation to disadvantaged groups, it can aid in understanding why social change and social uprisings are actually rather rare despite existing inequalities and marginalization of groups. For example, the theory posits that people generally want to "believe that the existing social system is good, fair, legitimate, and right."[16] System justification theory thus makes important contributions to understanding intergroup conflict and how out-group majorities can maintain power over marginalized populations. It could serve as a useful tool to keep in mind while developing programming for bridging intergroup divisions, especially if marginalized groups and majority groups where NDI has a presence do not necessarily accept that there are injustices in their systems.

Social dominance theory explores societal hierarchical structures and posits that most societies are formed through such structures.[17] This theory focuses on both individual and structural factors that contribute to intergroup conflict and group-based discrimination, and acknowledges that these things are driven by systematic and individual discrimination.[18] Literature on this theory includes a scale (social dominance orientation [SDO] scale), which scholars utilize to describe why some groups aim to dominate marginalized groups, and maintain in-group bias (favoring own group) and out-group antipathy (dislike of other group).[19]

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[12] Muzafer Sherif, "Superordinate Goals in the Reduction of Intergroup Conflict," in *Social Interaction: Process and Products* (Chicago: Transaction Publishers, 2006), 445.
[13] Janet Ward Schofield, "Realistic Group Conflict Theory," 4.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Leonie Huddy, "Contrasting theoretical approaches," 952.
[16] John T. Jost & Jojanekke van der Toorn, "System Justification Theory," in *Handbook of Theories of Social Psychology: Volume 2,* ed. Paul A.M. Van Lange et al., (Sage Publications Ltd., 2011), 4, http://dx.doi.org.ezp3.lib.umn.edu/10.4135/9781446249222
[17] Jim Sidanius and Felicia Pratto, "Social Dominance Theory," in *Handbook of Theories of Social Psychology: Volume 2,* (Sage Publications Ltd., 2011), 2, http://dx.doi.org.ezp3.lib.umn.edu/10.4135/9781446249222.n47
[18] Jim Sidanius et al., "Social Dominance Theory: Its Agenda and Method," *Political Psychology,* 25, no. 6, (December 2004): 846-47, https://doi-org.ezp3.lib.umn.edu/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2004.00401.x

[19] Huddy, 951 and 955.

Social dominance theory focuses on the differences between individuals and on variations in SDO scores among individuals (not considering their group identity). Critics argue that this emphasis on the individual scores denies the meaningful nature of variations in scores among people in the same group.[20] Some scholars have found that SDO scores vary by context as well, which suggests that they are impacted by variations in power dynamics.[21] Other scholars have observed that variations in scores on the SDO scale were related to variations in power positions. For example, class divisions among Jewish-Israeli populations diminished following efforts of Israeli Jews to think of the conflict as being between Israeli Jews and Palestinians.[22] Social hierarchies are maintained through underlying ideological hegemony which prevents dissenting behavior or rebellion among marginalized populations.[23]

Social identity theory describes the foundation of in-group biases and out-group antipathy. Proponents of the theory argue that before we can begin to understand intergroup divisions, we must understand the roots of these divisions, and they hold that "mere categorization is sufficient to explain the creation of social identity and intergroup discrimination."[24] Variations in group status and group boundaries are critical to understanding the development of intergroup divisions.[25] For example, in-group loyalties and out-group antipathies are common and frequently destructive when held by members of powerful groups.[26] Criticism of some aspects of social identity theory has led to the development of other theories. For example, social identity theory does not necessarily account for why groups actively participate in systems in which they are oppressed (system justification theory) or why intergroup conflict is not even more prevalent considering the pervasiveness and immensity of different group identities.[27]

In addition to the specific theories explored above, our team found that it was relevant to include the concepts of ***scope of justice*** and ***moral exclusion/inclusion*** for NDI to consider in its understanding and approach to intergroup divisions. The concept of a scope of justice refers to people's beliefs about who is deserving or undeserving of receiving justice. Generally, groups adopt a "morally inclusive" approach to their own group members, while adopting a "morally exclusive" approach to outgroups. This scope of justice can be wide or narrow, and is elastic; that is, it changes according to shifts in the societal, political, legal, and economic spheres in any particular context. In a wide scope of justice, "considerations of fairness are applied more broadly, resources are allocated in ways that foster the well-being of all, and there is an increased willingness to act generously and even make sacrifices to do so." In a narrow scope of justice, fewer groups receive the same considerations of fairness.

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[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Leonie Huddy "Contrasting theoretical approaches," 951
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid, 955.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid, 948.
[27] Esra Cuhadar and Bruce Dayton, "The social psychology of identity and inter-group conflict: From theory to practice," *International Studies Perspectives* vol. 12, no. 3, (2011), 275. https://doi-org.ezp2.lib.umn.edu/10.1111/j.1528-3585.2011.00433.x
[28] Susan Opotow, "The Scope of Justice, Intergroup Conflict, and Peace," *The Oxford Handbook of Intergroup Conflict* (2012).

The concept of moral exclusion/inclusion is important to consider when thinking about how to address issues of intergroup conflict. ***Moral exclusion*** is the process by which marginalized populations are denied legal protections and resources such as healthcare or education, and their well-being can be disregarded depending on whether a wide or narrow scope of justice is adopted.[29] Scholars have found that this concept of moral exclusion is closely related to destructive intergroup conflict. Combined with feelings of hate, it can be used to justify violent acts and discrimination.[30] For example, in Rwanda, colonialism and the policies imposed by German and Belgian colonizers exacerbated differences between Hutus and Tutsis. *Radio Rwanda* broadcasting of popular music interjected with hate speech and calls for murdering Tutsi enemies normalized the idea of extreme violence. The inaction of bystander nations and their refusal to acknowledge what was happening as "genocide" allowed the killing to continue for 100 days and claim 800,000 lives.[31] This case is an example of both active and passive moral exclusion.[32]

An additional method of reducing intergroup divisions is the concept of "***consideration of future consequences***," which essentially means compelling both sides to consider future consequences of conflict. Some scholars have concluded that, in cases of long-term conflict, this may lead opposing groups to cooperate.[33] For example, within the prisoner's dilemma game (PDG), cooperation occured when players realized that they may meet again in the future.[34] Within the concept of consideration of future consequences lies the conflict tactic of tit-for-tat, or in other words, violent retaliation. The conflict tactic of tit-for-tat can inhibit cooperation because "in absence of cooperation, hostility will be reciprocated."[35] Results of the tit-for-tat PDG suggest that "one way to promote [cooperative thinking] is to let the other side know that peaceful, cooperative actions will be reciprocated, as will hostile, competitive actions."[36] In 2005, former Prime Minister of Israel, Ariel Sharon, attempted to utilize tit-for-tat strategy by publicly stating: '"To a hand offered in peace, we will respond with an olive branch. But if [Palestinians] choose to fire, we will respond with fire, more severe than ever."'[37] This speech was followed by the highest death toll the region had seen in years, which illustrates how this strategy can result either in cooperation or further conflict.

In consideration of the aforementioned theories, critics argue that the scholarship on intergroup relations has largely ignored the role of both culture and history in the development of group identity.[38] Thus, while the theories discussed here are helpful in understanding the dynamics (and divisions) of intergroup relations, it is imperative to remember that these theories do not necessarily consider variations in context. However, the theories can generally be applied and adapted to different contexts. It should also be reiterated that the literature

[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Taya R. Cohen and Chester A. Inski, "War and peace: Possible approaches to reducing intergroup conflict," *Perspectives on Psychological Science* Vol. 3, no. 2 (2008).
[34] Ibid., 87.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Ibid., 89.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Huddy "Contrasting theoretical approaches."

available on the subject of intergroup divisions and the specific case of marginalized populations within groups is less focused on programming and more focused on social psychological theories.

PROGRAMMING AND PRACTICE REVIEW

Reducing Intergroup Divisions and Conflict in Practice

Our academic literature review identified several theories that could aid in understanding the causes of intergroup conflict and directly or indirectly inform NDI's thinking about programming in this field. While theories are a useful way to categorize and explain social phenomenons, understanding the implementation of these theories in practice is needed in order to identify feasible ways to reduce conflict between groups and to foster political inclusion of marginalized groups through programming. As we can see from our literature review on theories of intergroup conflict, intergroup divisions present specific challenges for emerging democratic societies. Marginalized populations within these societies present even greater challenges, as they are left out of political processes, social services, and society at large. As mentioned earlier, we found that it was somewhat challenging to locate sources that specifically referred to the issues of marginalized groups within intergroup divisions, but we were able to identify programs that implemented some of the theories we outlined above and could present useful examples for NDI to consider in its efforts to mainstream marginalized groups into their bridging intergroup divisions programming.

Intergroup Contact Theory in Practice and Programming

A helpful tool for NDI to consider in thinking about mainstreaming the inclusion of marginalized groups into its programming is USAID's "people-to-people" (or P2P) programming tool. People-to-people programming purposefully brings members of conflicting groups together to "interact purposefully in a safe, co-equal space to forge trust and empathy." This exemplifies the implementation of intergroup contact theory in its efforts to reduce intergroup conflict and violence. Although USAID does not directly identify intergroup contact theory as the basis for its P2P programming, the basic premise of this approach supports contact theory's focus on positive group encounters in order to mitigate conflict. The aim of P2P is to "create opportunities for a series of interactions between conflicting groups in the community to promote mutual understanding, trust, empathy, and resilient social ties."[40] USAID has applied the P2P approach in various countries. For example, in 2015 USAID began an ongoing P2P project in Nepal, which has over 103 ethnic groups and is susceptible to political marginalization.[41] P2P activities in USAID's West Bank and Gaza mission had over 40,000 participants, both Israelis

[39] USAID Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, "People-to-people peacebuilding: a program guide," January 2011, 5, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/CMMP2PGuidelines2010-01-19.pdf
[40] "People-to-people peacebuilding: a program guide," 2011.
[41] "Mitigating Conflict and Improving Implementation of Gender Equality and Social Inclusion Policies through a People-to-People Approach in Nepal," USAID, last modified January 10, 2018, accessed February 23, 2018, https://www.usaid.gov/nepal/fact-sheets/mitigating-conflict-and-improving-implementation-gender-equality-social-inclusion

and Palestinians, of which 72% reported "positive change" in their perceptions of one another.[42] A takeaway from USAID's P2P program that NDI can incorporate into its own programming is to make contact between groups a centralized aspect of programs aimed at reducing intergroup divisions, with a particular eye to marginalized groups that may have been left out of earlier programming. In particular, contact theory should be used to foster understanding between marginalized groups and groups in power. Dialogue should be encouraged and streamlined into NDI's bridging intergroup divisions programming in order to bolster the voices of marginalized groups.

Another organization with programming related to NDI's bridging intergroup divisions programming is: Search for Common Ground (SFCG), an international NGO that has several ongoing and completed programs and projects in Central African Republic (CAR) that aim to reduce intergroup divisions. For example, SFCG's Engaging Youth and Community Leaders to Prevent Mass Atrocities in Central African Republic was a 12-month project implemented in 2016 through 2017. This project had several goals specifically with "at risk" youth in mind in light of the violent conflict following the 2013 coup, which resulted in widespread deaths and displacement and disproportionately affected youth. It included a study which determined that conflict between groups in the districts examined[43] resulted primarily from socioeconomic inequalities and differences in political opinions. Following the completion of this project, SFCG recommended the development of action plans with local authorities and community leaders during district meetings in order to foster discussion and solutions to problems, in addition to increasing awareness about the aforementioned socioeconomic inequalities and socio-cultural diversity.[44] With regard to the socioeconomic inequalities, and in particular as these affect youth, SFCG promoted alternative livelihood activities for at-risk youth.[45] In general, SFCG's theory of change emphasizes immersion in local cultures and, although not explicitly stated, implementing contact theory in practice through cooperative action to help actors understand their differences.[46] NDI could take this recommendation and general theory of change into account, further employing intergroup contact theory into its programming on bridging intergroup divisions to promote change. This ensures that voices from the community are heard in order to address what is actually needed for conflict to be mitigated and for social cohesion to be promoted as effectively as possible.

Another relevant program is SFCG's "Zo Kwe Zo" (All People Are People) program, which ran from 2015 to 2017. This program focused on the interreligious nature of CAR's destabilized social cohesion and aimed to prevent inter-community violence, as well as to support an

[42] "USAID Invests in People to People Activities," USAID, last modified November 4, 2015, accessed February 23, 2018, https://www.usaid.gov/west-bank-and-gaza/fact-sheets/usaid-invests-people-people-activities
[43] Districts from SFCG's Youth Programming in CAR: PK5, Yakité, Fatima, and Miskine.
[44] "Project: Engaging Youth and Community Leaders to Prevent Mass Atrocities in Central African Republic (CAR)," Search for Common Ground, July 2011.
https://www.sfcg.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Conflit-scan2-ENG-09212017.pdf
[45] "Engaging Youth and Community Leaders to Prevent Mass Atrocities in Central African Republic (CAR)," Search for Common Ground,
https://www.sfcg.org/engaging-youth-community-leaders-prevent-mass-atrocities-central-african-republic-car-us-department-state-23-september-2016-31-october-2017/
[46] "Core Principles," Search for Common Ground, https://www.sfcg.org/about-us/core-principles/

inclusive peacebuilding process.[47] Although success in these two areas was only partially achieved due to the ongoing fragility of social cohesion in CAR, the presence of the Zo Kwe Zo program encouraged joint activities between Muslims and Christians. For example, solidarity and awareness-raising events were a significant part of the program's activities, and many observed that these events helped improve relations between Muslims and Christians through a participatory approach. Furthermore, the program worked with young people who had been part of but subsequently left armed groups. This aspect of the program was especially important in discouraging other youth present from both religious groups, from participating in violent armed conflict.[48] The use of intergroup contact theory resulted in semi-successful changes in a particularly challenging environment. NDI could adopt this approach in future programming as it has been shown to at the very least begin to address the problems of marginalized groups within these settings.

In their report on the 2017 elections in the conflict-affected Rift Valley region of Kenya, International Crisis Group (ICG) shared an example of intergroup contact theory in practice: community-based District Peace Committees which established dialogue channels between elders from different ethnic groups.[49] There was concern that persistent tensions between the two largest ethnic groups in the Rift Valley region of Kenya could erupt into violence during the August elections. International Crisis Group recommended that the government do more to revive the peacebuilding infrastructure.[50] While politicians from the two groups teamed up for elections, International Crisis Group argued that this was not a stable base from which to build lasting peace, as rumors of shifting support fuel anxieties of both groups. Another recommendation of International Crisis Group was to monitor political rallies and listen for any displays of ethnic hate speech. In an effort to more securely address divisions, International Crisis Group recommended that the national and county governments "facilitate inter-county talks involving elected officials."[51] Their recommendations and efforts focuses on grassroots reconciliation for lasting and sustainable peace.

Similarly, in their report on Buddhist nationalists in Myanmar, International Crisis Group did not explicitly mention any of the social psychology theories mentioned in this literature review. However, it is clear from their recommendation that ICG acknowledges the violation and persecution of the marginalized Muslim Rohingya minority in Myanmar, an implicit application of social dominance theory. Many Buddhist nationalists in Myanmar see any efforts to address human rights violations against the Rohingya as in effect giving up power to the Muslim minority (only 4% of the country identifies as Muslim). Additionally, Buddhists share a perception that members of Muslim communities will only conduct business with each other.[52] An attack in October 2016 fueled the fears of Buddhist nationalist groups and anti-Muslim

[47] "Zo Kwe Zo: All People Are People," Search for Common Ground, accessed April 17, 2018. https://www.sfcg.org/zo-kwe-zo/
[48] "Final Evaluation: Zo Kwe Zo," Search for Common Ground, January 29, 2018, accessed April 17, 2018, https://www.sfcg.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Zo-Kwe-Zo-Final-Evaluation-Report.pdf
[49] "Kenya's rift valley: Old wounds, devolution's new anxieties," International Crisis Group, May 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/kenya/248-kenyas-rift-valley-old-wounds-devolutions-new-anxieties
[50] Ibid.
[51] Ibid.
[52] "Buddhism and state power in Myanmar," International Crisis Group, September 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/290-buddhism-and-state-power-myanmar

sentiment increased, leading to violence.[53] The success of the Buddhist-nationalist group MaBaTha is in large part due to the sense of belonging that it provides its members. MaBaTha and other similar groups are providing space for citizens to participate in the development of their communities, education, and protecting their environment.[54] International Crisis Group concludes that any international intervention in Myanmar that does not account for the variety of motivations driving support for Buddhist nationalist groups will be ineffective in addressing the crisis or may lead to worse outcomes.[55] This conclusion may be directly applicable to how NDI thinks about majority communities as it begins programming with marginalized communities.

NDI CASE STUDIES

Bosnia and Herzegovina: 2011-2016

Beginning in 2011, USAID supported NDI's programmatic involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina through the Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS). The Political Processes Support Program was established to improve political outcomes and ethnic divisions in BiH. The program's key activities included the following: cross-party forums; candidate forums and televised debates; local and national policy development; support to local citizen initiatives; pre-election support for women; the young women's leadership academy; women's caucuses; and women's wings in political parties. Some of these activities will be discussed more in depth below.

This program employed intergroup contact theory to some extent, as exemplified by its *Cross-Party Forums* which facilitated dialogue across parties and resulted in the creation of a country-wide network of youth activists. Based on information from internal NDI reports, the BiH program did not seem to elaborate much on marginalized groups and does not mention their inclusion in the efforts to improve political outcomes. For example, in the *Local and National Public Policy Development* initiative, the program identified voter concerns and priorities through public opinion polls. The internal BiH reports we referenced do not mention whether NDI made efforts to reach marginalized populations, as one would assume that there are barriers to the political participation of marginalized groups in a highly ethnically charged country. Questions arise regarding the inclusion of marginalized groups in this and other initiatives of the program. For example, were the public opinion polls created in relevant languages and worded to reach marginalized populations? The BiH program did take into account women's marginalization and disadvantage, and thus employed various initiatives aimed at women. In one initiative, the *Women's Caucuses,* a cross-party, multi-party, and issue-based caucus was formed, which included the perspectives of and advocacy for implementation of policies affecting women and marginalized groups.

We gained further insights into the BiH programming through contact with members of NDI's BiH team. Regarding the inclusion of marginalized populations in NDI programming, the BiH team stated that the depth of ethnic divisions in the country was a rather unique situation that affected every aspect of Bosnian society. The team shared that despite these strong ethnic

[53] Ibid.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Ibid.

divides, language barriers were not necessarily an issue in programs such as *Cross-Party Forums*, as the three main ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats) communicated in the mutually intelligible languages of Bosnian, Serbian, and Croatian. What remains unclear, however, is if NDI included languages or dialects different enough to present a language barrier spoken by marginalized groups were in its BiH programming. For example, Romani vlax dialects are potentially a barrier for Roma communities in BiH participation in programming. It is our understanding that Romani vlax, and Romani languages in general, have adopted dialects from languages spoken where Roma populations live, and this could present a barrier to Roma voting and participation in community events. Furthermore, in materials on the activities of *Candidate Forums and Televised Debates*, NDI does not mention whether activities were captioned (in the case of televised debates) or interpreted in order to be accessible by people with certain disabilities.

NDI's BiH team also discussed with us the difficulties in getting groups to come to agreements and emphasized that intentional inclusion of marginalized groups is limited given the constraints present in Bosnian society. Because current membership in the main political parties in BiH is ethnically-based and limited to the three main ethnic communities, it essentially leaves out marginalized groups with a significant population. The team shared that this meant groups such as Roma did not have adequate political representation and that political changes designed to mitigate intergroup divisions between the three main groups were not geared to reach them. Despite these barriers, the team shared an important result of NDI's BiH programming regarding the Roma, which was the implementation of a "Preventing Hate Speech" initiative. This initiative primarily took into account Roma voices, as they continue to be the primary target of hate speech in BiH. The initiative helped with the effort to draft new legislation on hate speech, which was a particularly successful result given the difficulties and barriers to passing new legislation in BiH as a result of deep ethnic divisions and low-functioning political structures. NDI connected with Roma organizations and civil society groups that advocate for Roma issues to gain input on this initiative.

In addition, the team identified the inclusion of youth in BiH programming and their successes with youth programs as important incremental steps toward the inclusion of marginalized populations. The inclusion of youth is a large milestone in the context of Bosnian society, as youth are marginalized in the political sphere of Bosnia and their issues have not been heard in the past. To address this, NDI's BiH team worked with youth party branches (both formally and informally) and visited communities to identify issues relevant to youth in BiH. They found that unemployment is a major concern among youth. Through their programming, NDI BiH was able to facilitate cross-party and cross-ethnic interactions with different youth party members. Here, we can see contact theory being used to mitigate intergroup divisions among different youth. They also assisted with drafting policy positions on issues identified by youth. The NDI BiH team identified the largest success of the programming to be the inclusion of youth priorities to be shared prior to the 2018 elections and included within party platforms.

Bosnia and Herzegovina Programming Recommendations

For future programming in Bosnia and Herzegovina, we propose the following recommendations to the NDI team. Our hope is that these recommendations will help NDI

consider ways to mainstream the inclusion of marginalized groups within their programming in BiH. We recommend these actions based on feasibility given the limitations present in BiH.

Recommendation #1: NDI could collaborate with Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)'s existing programming on the inclusion of Roma population in political process.

OSCE has substantial influence and programming on inclusion of Roma in BiH in various sectors, including government. Because OSCE's presence is so widespread in the region, NDI could potentially collaborate with their field workers in Bosnia in Herzegovina to have a wider reach into the country's largest marginalized group.[56]

Recommendation #2: Conduct outreach to Roma women for inclusion in women's programming.

NDI's programming in BiH has done extensive work on the inclusion of women in political structures. Within this same framework, NDI could conduct outreach to Roma women who are marginalized both by their gender and their ethnicity. This would be an effective way to mainstream Roma women into NDI's already existing efforts to recruit women political leaders.

Recommendation #3: Conduct outreach to interpreters, captioners, and other individuals who have the capacity to assist in forums and televised debates in order to reach people with disabilities.

NDI could employ tactics to recruit interpreters for forums and captioning specialists for televised debates in order for its programming activities to be accessible by people with disabilities. We would recommend partnering with USAID on this particular effort. NDI could refer to USAID's Supporting Persons with Disabilities program in BiH and reach out to any individuals within this program who can help NDI mainstream more similar tactics into their programming.[57] Furthermore, USAID has service centers that offer short stays for youth with disabilities. These centers could be of use in recruiting interpreters, captioners, and youth with disabilities who could inform NDI on better practices for inclusion.[58]

Recommendation #4: Conduct outreach to Roma youth for inclusion in youth programming.

NDI's successful encouragement of youth participation in political life should take Roma youth into account and make them a priority in outreach efforts. Collaboration with local Roma associations could aid NDI in recruiting Roma youth into political life and to encourage dialogue between youth of different ethnic identities. We recommend that NDI reach out to potential collaborators in this particular effort, such as Melina Halilovic, who is the first Roma woman to be elected to a Municipal Council in Bosnia (in Visoko region) and has done extensive work on

[56] "Roma and Sinti," Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, accessed April 17, 2018, https://www.osce.org/mission-to-bosnia-and-herzegovina/roma-and-sinti
[57] "Fact Sheet: Supporting Persons with Disabilities in BiH (2010-Present)," USAID, last modified February 20, 2018, accessed April 17, 2018, https://www.usaid.gov/bosnia/fact-sheets/fact-sheet-supporting-persons-disabilities-bih-2010-present
[58] "Fact Sheet: Service Centers for Families of Children with Disabilities," USAID, last modified February 16, 2018, accessed April 17, 2018, https://www.usaid.gov/bosnia/fact-sheets/service-center-disabled-children-and-their-families

helping Roma women and youth succeed in Bosnia society. Halilovic may have valuable insights for NDI to implement into its youth and gender programming.

Recommendation #5: Mainstream LGBTI inclusion within existing gender and youth programming and refer to toolkits for inclusion of this population.

NDI could collaborate with existing activist organizations like Sarajevo Open Centre, the CURE Foundation, and Okvir[60] to identify how to reach LGBTI individuals with NDI programming.[61] Sarajevo Open Center was awarded a USAID grant in 2016 to establish additional regional centers in cities outside of Sarajevo and prior to this, there had been no formal LGBTI organizations outside of Sarajevo.[62] We encourage NDI to reference USAID's toolkit on inclusion of LGBTI groups into programming in Eastern Europe and Eurasia.[63] This toolkit provides examples of possible programming activities to mainstream the inclusion of LGBTI groups into already existing programming across various sectors and examines successful case studies in Ukraine, Serbia, and Moldova that could inform NDI on best practices regarding this marginalized group within the specific contexts of Eastern Europe and Eurasia.

Recommendation #6: Look beyond political party structures for inclusion of marginalized groups.

Due to the limited inclusion of marginalized groups in political party-based programming in BiH, we recommend that NDI could look beyond political party structures and reach out to advocacy groups in order to gain insights about how programming can be more inclusive of marginalized populations.

[59] Anja-Lejli Hessarbani, "Roma Women in the Shadow of their Identity," Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, April 7, 2017, accessed April 17, 2018, https://www.osce.org/stories/roma-women-in-the-shadow-of-their-identity
[60] Alex Cooper, "Living with Prajd: LGBTQ Activism in Bosnia and Herzegovina," CritCom, May 8, 2014, http://critcom.councilforeuropeanstudies.org/living-with-prajd-lgbtq-activism-in-bosnia-and-herzegovina/.
[61] "Bosnia and Herzigovina," ERA - LGBTI Equal Rights Association for Western Balkans and Turkey, May 27, 2016, http://www.lgbti-era.org/one-stop-shop/bosnia-herzegovina.
[62] "Strengthening LGBTI Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina," USAID, https://www.usaid.gov/bosnia/fact-sheets/strengthening-lgbt-rights-bosnia-and-herzegovina.
[63] "Toolkit for Integrating LGBT Rights Activities into Programming in the E&E Region," USAID, September 2014, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1863/LGBT%20Toolkit%20092414.pdf.

Central African Republic: 2014-2017

Inter-group conflict has plagued the Central African Republic for many years. Following an uprising by Muslim-dominated Seleka armed forces in 2013, former president François Bozizé was removed from office, leading to a series of violent conflicts and political transitions that further destabilized the country. As a result, Central African Republic has faced instability and religious conflict between Muslim (Seleka militias) and Christian groups (anti-Balaka militias).[64] NDI's CAR program ran from 2014 to 2017 and focused on promoting peace messaging and tolerance between these religious groups. The critical issues present regarding intergroup divisions in CAR dealt primarily with interfaith violence, with Muslim minorities being the target of attacks. NDI'S CAR programming was intended to rehabilitate relations among all Central Africans through "peace messaging" and promoting tolerance among different religious and ethnic groups.

NDI's CAR program employed intergroup contact theory to some extent. According to the 2014 evaluation of CAR programming, the program succeeded at bringing together various communities to raise awareness about differences through trainings, meetings, peace clubs, and radio programming. The most relevant aspect of programming in CAR to intergroup contact theory practices included discussions on social cohesion and the importance of reconciliation among 237 traditional and religious leaders, women and students. CAR programming was designed to help people across different groups (i.e. Christian and Muslim) to build bonds through providing a space for conversations and eventually for relationships to develop. One concern regarding the effectiveness of reaching marginalized groups, especially Muslims and Pygmies in CAR, was whether the reported increase in voter turnout for and citizen engagement with the election processes included these marginalized groups.[65] The final report of the CAR programming does not mention this, but rather it reports a general increase in confidence in elections and political officials from the general population. One important question to ask, therefore, is whether marginalized groups, not only Muslims and Pygmies, but also people with disabilities and LGBTI individuals, for example, were counted and targeted in the effort to increase citizenship engagement.

Following a conversation with a member of the CAR team, we learned that none of the programming in CAR included robust statistical work. Therefore, the focus was more on anecdotal reports and numbers provided by official bodies. The CAR team stated that the programming was more focused on making a difference rather than documenting it. They were not making an effort to explicitly disaggregate voter information, but were instead more focused on raising citizen confidence and participation in the electoral process. Thus, marginalized groups were not necessarily represented in the positive changes such as increased voter turnout and confidence in political officials and processes.

Bridging and bonding at the local level were the real focus of most of NDI's programming in CAR. Bonding focused on reinforcing shared local and national identities to reinforce a feeling of "we're all in this together." Prior to the development of the peace committees, this was achieved through having soccer games in communities which brought all

[64] Kitenge Fabrize Tunda, "Youth Engagement in Conflict Transformation in the Central African Republic," October 12, 2017, http://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/youth-engagement-conflict-transformation-central-african-republic/.
[65] Grant Godfrey, interviewed by Julia Fair and Annakarina Rincon, in Minneapolis, MN, March 2017.

members of the community to the same space in order to establish trust in the action of "playing a game together." Toward the end of NDI's programming in CAR, they began to introduce the linking elements. This included community solidarity plans and was particularly tied to work of civil society partners. Links between the peace committees and other political members were also made in the hope that this might increase the ability for political members to respond to community concerns. Civil society organizations served as information conduits to NDI. They were better able to synthesize and analyze the situation and help NDI to be more responsive.

Another potential source of inclusion for NDI's CAR team is whether or not (or to what extent) marginalized groups were represented in the Local Peace and Reconciliation Committees (CLPR in French) program. This program was designed to deliberately aim to include groups like pygmies and Muslims who had been disenfranchised or marginalized at the local level. This was done to attempt to create a space that is welcoming to everyone. However, the CAR team did note that some marginalized groups (i.e. persons with disabilities) could have been missed because the programming was not designed to be an "inclusion program." The design of the 2014-2017 programming in CAR was meant to help people build bonds across their differences (especially Christian and Muslim) and to create a space for conversations and relationships to develop. Civil society partners in CAR were trained on what was needed for peace committee members and to make sure that stakeholders in communities were present. The CAR team relied on local partners to say which communities to target — they released a call for proposals. The CAR team noted that in their efforts not to be too prescriptive, they gave up some of the certainty and therefore, they did not control the degree to which this programming was inclusive in who was selected to be part of the committee. The civil society partners were explicitly instructed to not overly incentivize or highlight perks of being involved in the peace committees. This was done in an effort to prevent the communities from viewing CLPR members as "elites."

An indicator of the success of NDI's CAR programming is the effort to facilitate the return of Muslim refugees. The attitude of communities where Muslim refugees are returning is also an indicator of the success of NDI's CAR programming. For example, in the town of Bouar, a returned refugee arrived home to discover that his home had an inhabitant who would not leave without payment for watching over his house. The CLPR president in this community was able to mediate and convince the inhabitant to leave without forcing the owner to pay. The inter-group cohesion demonstrated by Christian community members assisting the Fulani chief with a funeral ceremony also demonstrates the success of NDI's CAR programming. The Damara community has also shown indication that the CLPRs have had a significant impact in promoting inter-group cohesion.

Something not mentioned in the report is that deeply rural populations which are heavily disconnected are also marginalized and are especially difficult to reach with programming. While there are civil society organizations that are working toward the inclusion of women and youth, there are fewer working for rights for people with disabilities and even fewer (if any) LGBTI-rights organizations. Some of the communities that were reached with NDI programming, specifically the rural Pygmies, did not speak French (the majority language) and may not have

had a functioning school in their community for many years, presenting NDI with a very different and challenging programming environment.

With regard to the possibility of future programming in CAR, the NDI team stated that they are unsure of what more could be done to actively include additional marginalized populations.[66] They added that, if NDI hears that there is a group of people that NDI knows is not being included in their programming, they want to have the opportunity to adjust programming to address this. They noted that information is difficult to access in CAR so this makes it especially difficult to know how best to reach individuals with disabilities or the LGBTI population. In this context, it takes additional resources and efforts to make this a specific focus. In the future, if NDI were to return to CAR, they would like to focus on the inclusion of youth in their programming.

Central African Republic Programming Recommendations

In the event that NDI decides to initiate new programming in CAR, following our review of past reports and our conversation with the CAR team, we propose the following recommendations for future programming in CAR. We made an effort to emphasize the feasibility of these recommendations given the limitations present in CAR.

Recommendation #1: Develop relationships with existing organizations that are advocating for persons with disabilities in order to mainstream PWDs into CAR programming.

Through collaborating with existing organizations, NDI will be able to mainstream the inclusion of PWDs into future CAR programming. Active efforts to further include marginalized populations like PWDs and make programs more accessible does not make it an "inclusion program." NDI should explicitly make efforts to include PWDs in their programming efforts regarding political participation. From reports on the status of PWDs in CAR, we know that they are some of the most marginalized within CAR society and are effectively left of out political processes.[67] It is thus important that NDI take steps to make this population a priority in their efforts to mainstream the inclusion of marginalized populations in their programming.

Recommendation #2: Identify any existing barriers to reaching those in extremely rural communities (i.e. language, distance).

The CAR team explained that those in rural populations are marginalized in that they are incredibly difficult to reach. The CAR team mentioned language and distance as examples of barriers to reaching these populations. Efforts should be made to collaborate with MINUSCA who could assist with reaching those in rural areas, as they have a widespread influence and reach. NDI needs to be proactive in consideration of accessing marginalized populations during their program design and budgeting.

Recommendation #3: Further foster the existing relationships developed by former CAR NDI Country Director with organizations focussing on youth programming.

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[66] Ibid.

[67] "Central African Republic: People with Disabilities Left Behind," Human Rights Watch, April 28, 2015, central-african-republic-people-disabilities-left-behind.

NDI should collaborate with these organizations to introduce youth-centered programming in CAR. During our discussion with the CAR team, we asked what future programming would focus on, and he shared with us that there is definite potential to build on these relationships and focus on the inclusion of youth in future programming.

Recommendation #4: NDI could build a relationship and partner with MINUSCA.

As we mentioned in recommendation #2, MINUSCA has a wide reach and presence in CAR and thus may be a useful collaborator for NDI's future programming in the country. MINUSCA's expansive mandate includes peacebuilding and transitional justice which emphasizes the inclusion of marginalized groups in the peacebuilding process.[68]

Recommendation #5: Continue to work toward including Pygmy population in NDI programming.

Within programming efforts to build social cohesion and building institutions to increase political participation, NDI could partner with Pygmies to ensure that they are part of increasing political participation. The CAR team mentioned language barriers to reaching this population, and thus we recommend that NDI partner with organizations that focus exclusively on indigenous peoples and in protecting these populations. Organizations like Survival International may have useful ideas about how to best reach Baka groups in CAR.[69]

[68] "Mandate," MINUSCA, https://minusca.unmissions.org/en/mandate.
[69] "Pygmies," Survival International, accessed April 20, 2018, https://www.survivalinternational.org/tribes/pygmies.

DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OF THE SECURITY SECTOR

This part of the report will focus on democratic governance of the security sector. It will begin with a literature review examining the evolution of democratic governance of the security sector since the 1990s, which will be followed by a review of related programming by NGOs targeted toward NDI's marginalized populations of focus: ethnic and religious minorities, LGBTI persons, youth, and persons with disabilities. This will be followed by a case study analysis of NDI programming in the Sahel region of Africa geared toward improving NDI's involvement of marginalized groups in democratic governance of the security sector.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Though there is an extensive body of academic and policy literature on the subject of security sector reform, considerations about the inclusion of marginalized groups in this process are nascent. Providing for civilian control and democratic governance of the military and security forces is a crucial step in the transition to peacetime. Security sector reform, which is the overarching process that includes democratic governance, is often missing a discussion of *how* marginalized groups[70] are affected by and can play a role in this process, though writing on the subject generally acknowledges that they should.[71] The importance of "local ownership"[72] is frequently discussed in the literature, but this is largely generalized without any deeper analysis of the different groups that make up local populations. This review aims to examine how the current literature on theories and programming related to democratic governance of the security sector discusses marginalized groups, what gaps may exist in this literature, and how those theories can relate to programming.

The phrase "security sector reform" originates from a 1994 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) document,[73] which outlined a code of conduct for Member States in regard to the political and military aspects of security. This same year the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) published a Human Development Report discussing the importance of security sector reform.[74] One of the earliest mentions of "democratic governance of the security sector" was in a 2003 framework, the creation of which was financed by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[75] The framework was "designed to promote dialogue among local actors from the political, developmental and security fields in countries that are contemplating engaging in security sector reform."[76] This emphasis on democratic governance appears to arise from the observed weakness of governments in many countries also flagged for security sector reform. For example, Nicole Ball, a fellow at the Centre for

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[70] Marginalized populations are groups excluded based on identity factors, including age, ethnicity, religion, disability, sexuality and/or gender identity.
[71] E.g. Organisation for Economic Co-operation Development, *The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice*, 2008.
[72] Nicole Ball and Derick W. Brinkerhoff, "Strengthening Democratic Governance of the Security Sector in Conflict-affected Countries," *Public Administration and Development* 25, no. 1 (2005).
[73] Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, "Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security" (report, Budapest, 1994), https://www.osce.org/fsc/41355.
[74] "UNDP Human Development Report 1994," (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 1994), http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf.
[75] Nicole Ball, Bouta, T. and van de Goor, L., "Enhancing Democratic Governance of the Security Sector: An Institutional Assessment Framework," (report, The Hague, 2003).
[76] Ibid., 12.

International Policy who specializes in democratic governance of the security sector, observes that, "The existence of unprofessional and unaccountable security services derives...from the failure to develop effective democratic political systems."[77] While the phrase "democratic governance of the security sector" has not been adopted in academic security sector reform literature, it is prevalent among groups that engage in security sector reform programming. It may be that due to the relatively recent recognition of the importance of security sector reform in the peacebuilding process, study of subfields such as democratic governance of the security sector have yet to be undertaken by scholars. Notably, in 2014 the United Nations Security Council adopted its first stand-alone resolution on security sector reform, Resolution 2151, which stressed inclusion through national ownership of security sector reform processes.[78]

Despite the sparse scholarship on democratic governance of the security sector per se, there is a rich body of thinking about civil-military relations, a field dating back to the 1950s, which is closely related to democratic governance of the security sector.[79] There are two schools of thought on civil-military relations: the institutional school and the sociological-cultural school.[80] The institutional school "focuses on how the actors in a polity, including the military as an organization, interact within the institutional framework of a given polity's government."[81] Samuel Huntington, credited with creating this school in 1957, identified civilians as separate groups vying for power who cannot work together due to their "large number, varied character, and conflicting interests."[82] Huntington conceptualized a binary competition between civilians and the military that focused on the institutions of civilian control (such as governments and legislatures) but did not consider broader societal issues, especially marginalized groups. By contrast, the sociological-cultural school, which looks at relationships within the military and between the military and society, as well as the role of individuals and groups such as marginalized populations, is more applicable to NDI's work on inclusion in democratic governance, as it acknowledges complexities that Huntington's work did not.[83]

In particular, "concordance theory," a branch of the sociological-cultural school conceived by scholar Rebecca Schiff which advocates for a cooperative relationship between the military, political elites, and citizens,[84] has been recognized by scholars in the field as "a better structure [than traditional theories] for examining non-Western cases and enabling the introduction of cultural variables into the argument [of civil-military relations]."[85] The basis of this theory is that the greater the ability of these three groups to agree on four indicators --

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[77] Ibid.
[78] United Nations, General Assembly, *Resolution 2151(2014),* S/RES/2151, (28 April 2014), http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2151.
[79] Mackubin Thomas Owens, "Civil–Military Relations," *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies* (2010), http://internationalstudies.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-123.
[80] Ibid.
[81] Ibid.
[82] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: the Theory and Politics of Civil-military Relations* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 80.
[83] Owens, 2010.
[84] Rebecca Schiff, *The Military and Domestic Politics: A concordance theory of civil-military relations,* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 43.
[85] E.g. Donald S. Inbody, review of *The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations*, by Rebecca Schiff, *Armed Forces and Society* 36, no. 5 (2010): 933.

social composition of the officer corps, political decision-making process, recruitment method, and military style — the lower the likelihood of domestic military intervention.[86] The "active agreement" component is of the utmost importance to concordance theory, but this agreement can take many forms, such as through legislation, decree, or constitution.[87]

Concordance theory is relevant when developing programming to incorporate marginalized groups into processes of democratic governance of the security sector because of how citizenry is defined. Schiff insists that application of the theory must be tailored to each country-specific context, and she envisions a citizenry that is heterogeneous and "comprised of individuals who are members of unions or associations, urban workers and entrepreneurs, rural farm workers, those who may have the right to vote, or other groups that may be disenfranchised."[88] Unlike Huntington's binary approach, Schiff's theories include the potential for incorporating marginalized communities into thinking about democratic governance of the security sector.

Nicole Ball describes a similar citizenry in her scholarship on democratic governance of the security sector. Ball identifies five major categories of local actors: bodies legally mandated to use force; civil management and oversight bodies; judicial and public-security bodies; non-state security bodies; and non-statutory civil society bodies.[89] Bodies legally mandated to use force would be equivalent to Schiff's "military" category; civil management and oversight bodies are most similar to Schiff's "political elites" grouping; and non-statutory civil society bodies are Ball's version of "citizenry." Similar to Schiff, Ball includes trade unions in her description of non-statutory civil society bodies, and what is interesting for our purposes is that she also identifies religious organizations, and more broadly non-governmental organizations, advocacy organizations, and the concerned public.[90] Both of these definitions of what constitutes the "civil" in civil-military relations demonstrate a dramatic, more inclusive shift in the way citizens are envisioned in the field. Comparing Huntington's conceptualization of citizenry to that of Ball and Schiff, we can see how the interests and motivation of the citizens involved in civil-military relations have moved to the forefront of civil-military relations.

The idea of contact theory, described in the earlier analysis of Bridging Intergroup Divisions, has surreptitiously penetrated the field of democratic governance of the security sector as well. In the literature we reviewed, military and civilian elites are often referred to as a group that has to reconcile with a second group comprised of civil society and civilians. The need to reconcile is generally traced back to the breakdown of trust,[91] which is often the case in countries where NDI works, and the way for this trust to be rebuilt is through interaction between the two groups.[92] This common line of thought in literature on the subject is accompanied by affirmations of civil society's role as an important actor in democratic

[86] Schiff, 2009.
[87] Ibid.
[88] Ibid., 44.
[89] Ball and Brinkerhoff, 2005, 38.
[90] Ibid.
[91] E.g. Vanessa Johanson, "Creating an Inclsuive Burmese Peace Process," United States Institute for Peace, published May 8, 2017, https://www.usip.org/publications/2017/05/creating-inclusive-burmese-peace-process.
[92] Ibid.; Karen Barnes and Peter Albrecht, "Civil Society Oversight of the Security Sector and Gender," Gender and Security Sector Reform *Toolkit*, eds. Megan Bastick and Kristin Valasek, (Geneva: DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, UN-INSTRAW, 2008).

governance in general and as it pertains to the security sector in particular.[93] There appears to be consensus in the field that broader is better when it comes to how wide the net should be cast in civil society engagement; buy-in for security sector reform is increased when members of as many diverse groups as possible are involved. Marc Plattner writes that, "For a regime to be considered democratic today, it also must protect the rights of individuals and minorities"; it is becoming better understood that in order to protect the rights of minorities, the government should first listen to what they recognize as their needs.[94] Looking beyond what a government can do for its people, the U.S. Institute for Peace identified six key ways traditionally marginalized populations can support and be engaged in democracy building: improved accountability; leading from behind the scenes, such as by conducting research and drafting agreements; promoting advocacy and awareness; expanding the debate to sensitive topics; influencing negotiations; and facilitating and providing safety nets in the event the formal peacebuilding process falters.[95] Gordon et al. encourages practitioners to look beyond the obvious civil society and community groups, which can also be exclusionary, for other disenfranchised groups.[96]

PROGRAMMING AND PRACTICE REVIEW

The following is a disaggregated, in-depth look at programming relating to the inclusion of marginalized populations in democratic governance of the security sector. Although programs tend to target a specific marginalized population, the same strategies can likely be adapted and used to engage various groups. When applicable, we will match programs with related theories from the literature review. We will begin by looking at programming for ethnic and religious minorities and indigenous peoples, followed by programming for LGBTI groups, youth, and persons with disabilities.

Ethnic and Religious Minorities and Indigenous Peoples and Democratic Governance of the Security Sector

Ethnic and religious minorities and indigenous peoples are distinct groups, but they often face similar challenges that can be addressed with corresponding solutions. There are no internationally agreed definitions for minorities or indigenous peoples.[97] In fact, the two statuses can overlap between and within groups; for example, women and girls can be minorities within

[93] Eden Cole, Kerstin Eppert, and Katrin Kinzelbach (editors), "Public Oversight of the Security Sector: A Handbook for Civil Society Organizations" (handbook, 2008), http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/documents/partners/civil_society/publications/2008_UNDP_CSO-Handbook-Public-Oversight-of-the-Security-Sector-2008.pdf; Johanson, 2017; Marina Caparini, "Civil Society and the Future of Security Sector Reform," in *The Future of Security Sector Reform,* ed. Mark Sedra (Ontario: The Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2010), https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/the_future_of_security_sector_reform.pdf; Barnes and Albrecht, 2008.
[94] Marc F. Plattner, "Populism, Pluralism, and Liberal Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 21, no. 1 (2010): 84.
[95] Johanson, 2017.
[96] Eleanor Gordon, Anthony Cleland Welch, and Emmicki Roos, "Security Sector Reform and the Paradoxical Tension between Local Ownership and Gender Equality," *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 4, no. 1 (2015): 1-23.
[97] United Nations, "Minority Rights: International Standards and Guidance for Implementation" (report, New York and Geneva, 2010), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/MinorityRights_en.pdf.

an indigenous group.[98] Additionally, "indigenous people can claim minority rights under international law, [but] there are [also] United Nations mandates and mechanisms dedicated specifically to protecting their rights."[99] The main differentiator between the two groups, though still not infallible, is that indigenous people have "long ancestral, traditional and spiritual attachment and connections to their land and territories," which minorities will not necessarily have.[100] Unfortunately, the two groups are almost certain to share experiences of discrimination, marginalization, and exclusion.[101]

There are two main schools of thought regarding peacebuilding after conflicts driven by ethnic differences.[102] Consociationalism encourages the recognition of ethnicity in politics and posits that power sharing can be a way to protect ethnic groups' respective interests.[103] As such, consociationalism is closely aligned with the idea of democratic governance of the security sector. The second school of thought, integrationist theory, promotes institutions that do not incorporate ethnic identities into their functioning so as to reduce the salience of such identities and therefore also reduce the likelihood of ethnic tensions.[104]

A review of the literature suggests that there is greater support for consociationalism in the field of security sector reform. A 2016 study of local security actors in Kosovo found that "ethnic representation has a consistent and statistically significant effect on safety perceptions, displaying that municipalities that have representative security institutions report levels of perceived safety that are above the national average."[105] The authors concluded that ethnically representative local security institutions, particularly police and judges, are "vital to address grievances resulting from unequal treatment, help breaking down linguistic barriers, increase social capital, and ultimately affect how safe citizens feel in their community."[106] This finding played out in practice years earlier in 2001, when the equal representation of different ethnic groups in Macedonia's public administration, particularly police services, was built into the peace agreement that ended fighting between the Macedonian armed forces and the Albanian National Liberation Army.[107]

Reserved legislative seats for ethnic minorities is another way the theory of consociationalism has been used in practice. Scholars have argued that the reservation of legislative seats for various classifications of minorities, not just ethnic minorities, is an emerging international norm.[108] For example, in Latin America and Oceania, seats are reserved for indigenous peoples; in some Middle Eastern countries seats are saved for minority religions;

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[98] "Minorities and Indigenous Peoples," Right to Education Initiative, accessed April 30, 2018, http://www.right-to-education.org/issue-page/marginalised-groups/minorities-and-indigenous-peoples.
[99] "Minority Rights: International Standards and Guidance for Implementation," 2010.
[100] Ibid.
[101] "Minorities and Indigenous Peoples."
[102] John Laidlaw Gray and Julia Strasheim, "Security Sector Reform, Ethnic Representation and Perceptions of Safety: Evidence from Kosovo," *Civil Wars* 18, no. 3 (2016): 352.
[103] Ibid.
[104] Ibid.
[105] Ibid.
[106] Ibid.
[107] Ali Dikici, "Introducing Multi-Ethnic Policing in Macedonia: The Role of the OSCE," *USAK Yearbook of Politics and International Relations*, no. 1 (2008): 263-84.
[108] Mona Lena Krook and Diana Z. O'Brien, "The Politics of Group Representation: Quotas for Women and Minorities Worldwide," *Comparative Politics* 42, no. 3 (2010): 253-72, http://www.jstor.org.ezp2.lib.umn.edu/stable/27822309.

and as of 2003, Rwanda reserves seats for youth and people with physical disabilities.[109] One theory behind seat reservation is that it is done for one of two reasons: protection or power-sharing. Seat reservation based on protection is symbolic as the quantity of seats is minimal and often used as a way to "compensate for past oppression."[110] Reserving seats with the goal of power sharing involves a more equal division with the goal of ensuring "democratic stability in a divided society."[111] As power sharing is part of the theory of consociationalism, NDI could prioritize power sharing as an end goal of PSDR programming, helping make those marginalized voices part of the legislative debate on the security sector.

The United States Institute for Peace (USIP) has done significant inter- and intra-faith work on the basis that religion has historically been sidelined from the peacebuilding process even though 84 percent of people in the world associate themselves with a religious group.[112] Examples of USIP's work in this area include building a coalition of Buddhists, Hindus, Christians, and Muslims in Sri Lanka who work together to mitigate local conflicts; establishing the Echumenical Women Peacebuilders Network, a group of Catholic and Protestant women who have been involved in Colombia's peace process; organizing dialogues at Pakistani universities about religious violence and radicalization;[113] and reporting on the inclusiveness of Burma's peace process.[114]

In 2013, USIP launched its Initiative to Map the Religious Landscape in Conflict-Affected States, which aims to support the engagement of practitioners and diplomats with religious sectors in complex environments. Mapping of Libya has been completed, and mappings are underway for South Sudan, Burma, and Iraq.[115] The methodology for the Libya map included the following steps: (1) Review of social media, websites, print and electronic media, etc.; (2) Phone interviews with diaspora Libyans, mainly in the U.S., to get a sense of the religious landscape (50+ interviews); (3) Venn Diagram mapping of religious sector actors; (4) Developed questionnaire and interview guide; (5) Developed criteria for sampling and hiring local researchers; (6) Trained local researchers; (7) Implemented research; and (8) Researchers presented findings and submitted interviews.[116] The qualitative interview guide consisted of 12 semi-structured questions that focused on *who* in the religious sector does *what* in relation to peace, and *how*; what the religious sector's current and potential influence on peace and democratic transition in Libya is; and ways USIP can engage the religious sector in current and future peace and justice programming in Libya. They sought to interview traditional religious leaders; members of government-based religious institutions and universities; members of political parties; civil society engaged with the religious sector; tribal/community leaders; militia members; and legal advocates/scholars.[117]

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[109] Ibid.
[110] Ibid., 263.
[111] Ibid.
[112] "Religious Engagement in Peacebuilding," United States Institute for Peace, published December 7, 2017, https://www.usip.org/publications/2017/12/religious-engagement-peacebuilding.
[113] Ibid.
[114] Johanson, 2017.
[115] "Religious Landscape Mapping in Conflict-Affected States," United States Institute for Peace, accessed April 15, 2018, https://www.usip.org/index.php/programs/religious-landscape-mapping-conflict-affected-states.
[116] "Understanding the Role of Libya's Religious Actors in Confronting Violent Extremism," YouTube video, 1:27:47, uploaded April 17, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oBGIfRXk6ZI.
[117] Ibid.

At the presentation of the Libya mapping's findings, USIP affirmed NDI's approach to religion and ethnicity as connected, and stated that religious and ethnic authority in Libya are inseparable; for example, Tuaregs enjoy both religious and ethnic authority.[118] Another relevant finding is that actors representing traditional religious leaders have not been significantly involved in peacebuilding or democratic transition efforts in Libya, but when they have been, they have proven effective at advancing reconciliation.[119] For example, tribal elders were found to be capable of enforcing the excommunication of people who threaten the social cohesion of the community.[120]

LGBTI Groups and Democratic Governance of the Security Sector

There is wide recognition of the marginalization of people who are lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) and the need to ensure their human rights are upheld in all areas, including security sector reform.[121] However, there has been limited discussion about how this marginalized group can play an active role in security sector reform, particularly as it pertains to democratic governance.

Not involving LGBTI groups in security sector reform processes can have long-term consequences. For example, one study found that causes for a lack of trust among the Serbian LGBTI community in the country's police include "the belief that the institutions operate according to well-established practices, that they are burdened by the legacy of abuse in the past and that they have not gone through [the] lustration process."[122] Similarly, the community's lack of trust in the Serbian Armed Forces stems from a "misunderstanding of the role of the military in the modern security context, but also from the lack of familiarity with the reform processes implemented by the institution."[123] Both of these explanations suggest that involvement of LGBTI people in the security sector reform process could have been prevented this distrust at least in part.

Running from 2013-2017, USAID's LGBTI Global Development Partnership is an example of programming in the form of a public-private partnership. Operating in 14 countries, the program sought to strengthen the capacity of LGBTI leaders and civil society organizations; train LGBTI leaders to effectively participate in democratic processes and run organizations; conduct research to inform national, regional, and global policy and programs; and promote economic empowerment through enhanced LGBTI entrepreneurship and business development.[124] A few key outcomes of the program included "Training 182 LGBTI leaders in Europe/Eurasia and Latin America/Caribbean in democratic participation" and "Publishing eight landscape

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[118] Ibid.
[119] Ibid.
[120] Ibid.
[121] E.g. Maria Otero, "Transforming Public Security in the Americas," U.S. Department of State, published May 10, 2011, https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/162948.htm.
[122] Jelena Radoman, Marija Radoman, Svetlana Đurđević-Lukić, and Branka Anđelković, *LGBT People and Security Sector Reform in the Republic of Serbia* (Belgrade: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and OSCE Mission in Serbia, 2011), 9, http://www.publicpolicy.rs/publikacije/cddd7a3f395d923e21a917e70d457cb32ce539c9.pdf.
[123] Ibid.
[124] "LGBTI Global Development Partnership," USAID, published May 12, 2017, https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/fact-sheets/lgbt-global-development-partnership.

analyses which provide detailed overviews of the social, political, and economic conditions for LGBTI people in each country and offer recommendations for allies, advocates, and funders."[125]

The Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit created by the OSCE, UN, and Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) offers the following anecdotes of collaboration between LGBTI persons and security actors:

> In Ireland, the Gay and Lesbian Equality Network partnered with the Irish police (An Garda Síochána) to address hate-motivated incidents and crimes against LGBTI people. The 'Be Proud, Be Safe' campaign includes specially trained Garda gay Liaison Officers who work with LGBTI people who have been victims of hate-motivated incidents, during a weekly 'drop in' session in the Dublin-based gay community centre. The Liaison Officers inform members of the LGBTI community of their rights and encourage victims to report crimes so that perpetrators can be brought to the courts.[126]

Youth and Democratic Governance of the Security Sector

Youth are frequently identified as key players in peacebuilding programs across the world, and their contributions are seen as important and necessary. UN Security Council Resolution 2250[127] is focused on youth, peace, and security, thus demonstrating how highly the international community views the role youth have to play in the security process. From this, the role youth can play in the democratic governance of the security sector can begin to be identified. Youth are often recognized as a group of people who can equally be victims and perpetrators of violence,[128] and in order to address these challenges, the goal has become to involve them in the peacebuilding process.

Organizations such as the University of San Diego's Institute for Peace and Justice and Chemichemi Ya Ukweli, a Nigerian peacebuilding organization, have brought youth leaders together with police forces to facilitate discussions of how better communication between groups can lead to a reduction in violence.[129] What emerged from these discussions was that the youth groups often felt afraid of the police, and that facilitating dialogues with a third party present helped to reduce some of these fears.[130] It seems likely that many other marginalized

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[125] "The LGBTI Global Development Partnership: Promoting Global LGBTI Human Rights, Equality, and Economic Empowerment," USAID, accessed April 15, 2018, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2496/LGBTI_Global_Development_Partnership_Fact_Sheet_Final_160622.pdf.

[126] Shelby Quast, "Justice Reform and Gender," in *Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit*, eds. Megan Bastick and Kristin Valasek (Geneva: DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, UN-INSTRAW, 2008), 13.

[127] "Resources on Youth, Peace and Security," United Nations, accessed April 15, 2018, https://www.un.org/development/desa/youth/international-youth-day-2017/resources-on-youth-peace-and-security.html.

[128] David Nosworthy (editor), *Seen, but not Heard: Placing Children and Youth on the Security Governance Agenda,* (Piscataway: Transaction Publishers, 2009), https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/Seen_but_not_Heard.pdf.

[129] Teresa Crawford, "Increasing the Peace: How community engagement improves security sector reform," Alliance for Peacebuilding, published January 13, 2014, http://www.allianceforpeacebuilding.org/2014/01/increasing-the-peace-how-community-engagement-improves-security-sector-reform/.

[130] Zahra Ismail, "Police-Youth Forum in Kenya Bridges Fears and Marks Next Steps Toward Peaceful Elections," Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace and Justice Blog, published December 5, 2012,

groups may feel fear toward the security sector, and this strategy of facilitated dialogues can serve as a beginning step toward reducing these fears. Disaffected and unemployed youth are seen as serious threats toward stability, and by incorporating them into democratic systems, and ensuring that their voice is heard, the hope is that their potential threat can be reduced or eliminated. Establishing partnerships between civil society organizations (CSOs) that focus on youth development with local governments can lead to better youth involvement in the democratic governance of the security sector. NDI can work to emphasize the importance of youth involvement in the security sector reform process, and using tools like the NDI Youth Handbook to foster meaningful inclusion.

USIP has found success in its peace education for youth programming in Afghanistan, which it began in 2014. For example, USIP has partnered with both private and public higher education institutions to develop and implement a curriculum-based peace and conflict studies course.[131] So far, nearly 2,000 students have taken the course, after which peace clubs have been formed at the three partner universities that have organized activities such as debates and blood drives.[132] Additionally, USIP has helped develop peace education curriculum for grades 7-12. Over 1,800 teachers have been trained in the curriculum, which will hopefully be implemented after a pilot test in local schools by the Ministry of Education and Teachers Education Department.[133]

PWD and Democratic Governance of the Security Sector

Some scholars have discussed the difficulties of including persons with disabilities in the overall peacebuilding process. World Institute on Disability has written how one of the challenges[134] that persons with disabilities face when engaging in the larger peacebuilding process is that they are perceived as a homogenous group. This leads to stakeholders missing the depth and breadth of experiences within disabled populations, which can lead to policy recommendations that are wildly off base. Stephanie Kerr[135] has pointed to the "medical model" of disability as a barrier toward true involvement for persons with disabilities in conflict resolution processes, and she has argued that disability should be viewed through the "social model" lens. In this model, the focus is on how violence creates and perpetuates disability as an oppressive structure, rather than focusing on the impairments that may have resulted from the violence. Claudia Bell[136] has gone as far as suggesting that the "relief" model that many NGOs

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http://sites.sandiego.edu/ipj/2012/12/05/police-youth-forum-in-kenya-bridges-fears-and-marks-next-steps-toward-peaceful-elections/.

[131] "Peace Education in Afghanistan," United States Institute for Peace, accessed on April 15, 2018, https://www.usip.org/programs/peace-education-afghanistan.

[132] Ibid.

[133] Ibid.

[134]"The Involvement of Persons with Disabilities in Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding Efforts: Inclusions of Persons with Disabilities (PWD) as Part of the Solution in the Post-Conflict Arena," World Institute on Disability, accessed on April 3, 2018. https://worldinstituteondisabilityblog.files.wordpress.com/2015/11/wid-disability-inclusive-peacebuilding-process.pdf

[135] Stephanie Kerr (2013) Disability and conflict: exploring how the peace process in Northern Ireland assesses and addresses the needs of persons with disabilities, Disability & Society, 28:6, 826-838, DOI: 10.1080/09687599.2013.808575

[136] Claudia Bell (2007) Disability in the Context of Armed Conflict Situations. Paper presented at GSI Bonn November 7-8, 2007.

operate under creates passivity within the disabled community, which only further serves to reduce their engagement in society.

The role of persons with disabilities in well-functioning democracies has been recognized by many institutions, and the need to involve their voices has grown. However, the voices of persons with disabilities has largely been absent from discussions and policies of democratic governance of the security sector, in addition to the larger discussion of security sector reform.[137] Pearl Gottshalk has produced one of the only case studies[138] that has dealt with the role of persons with disabilities in the peacebuilding process writ large, which illustrates the complete absence of any literature surrounding the needs of people with disabilities in conflict areas. People with disabilities are uniquely vulnerable to conflict and abuses by the security sector, and thus need to have an active voice in the process of democratic governance of the security sector.

International actors have recognized the vulnerability of people with disabilities during conflict,[139] and that there is a gap in thinking about how to protect citizens with disabilities during conflict, beyond general civilian protections. With the near-universal ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD),[140] states are now encouraged to consider the specific needs of persons with disabilities in conflict zones. Organizations like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have put out specific guidance[141] toward ensuring persons with disabilities are protected during and post-conflict. This sort of protection is important, but the discussion is limited to treating persons with disabilities as static actors in need of protection, rather than people with agency, who deserve a say in their own lives. Driving home the importance of the CRPD with NDI's local partners may be the best way to emphasize the importance of disability inclusion in many contexts, and it will be important for NDI to track the efforts made to include persons with disabilities, so that programming ideas and trends can be shared and collected.

NDI CASE STUDY

The Sahel: 2014-Today

In 2014, NDI began its programming to strengthen democratic control and oversight of the security sector in the Sahel. Based in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, NDI's work in the Sahel seeks to enhance the institutional framework that governs the security sector, while also

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http://bezev.fastnetworx.de/fileadmin/Neuer_Ordner/Literatur/Bibliothek/Tagungsdokumentationen/Humanitaere_Hilfe/hi_dok_disability_and_conflict_07-endv.pdf

[137] Pearl Gottschalk, "'How are We in this World Now?' Examining the Experiences of Persons Disabled by War in the Peace Processes of Sierra Leone" (master's thesis, University of Victoria, 2007), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DISABILITY/Resources/News---Events/463933-1184017167861/3975400-1229373211417/Gottshalk_ExecSumm.pdf.

[138] Ibid.

[139] Catalina Devandas, Shantha Rau Barriga, Gerard Quinn, and Janet E. Lord, "Protecting civilians with disabilities in conflicts," Nato Review, published January 12, 2017, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2017/Also-in-2017/Protecting-civilians-with-disabilities-in-conflicts/EN/index.htm.

[140] "Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)," United Nations, accessed April 15, 2018, https://www.un.org/development/desa/disabilities/convention-on-the-rights-of-persons-with-disabilities.html.

[141] "How law protects persons with disabilities in armed conflict," International Committee of the Red Cross, accessed April 15, 2018, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/how_law_protects_persons_with_disabilities_in_war.pdf.

building greater respect for democratic norms among security sector actors. A large part of this centers around supporting local civil society groups (CSOs) in each country who are engaged in strengthening democratic governance of the security sector. Another crucial component focuses on improving oversight and monitoring of the security sector by the legislative and executive branches as well as CSOs.

In each country, NDI and its partner organization, the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF), began their work by familiarizing themselves with the local contexts of each program. Following this, NDI and DCAF worked to find entry points for their areas of expertise and met with local organizations and political leaders. This work led to engagement with the National Assembly in Mali, along with legislative leaders in both Burkina Faso and Niger. Some limitations arose as a result of instability on the ground, especially in Mali, and others came about due to the relatively new nature and concept of security sector reform.

The primary inclusion efforts undertaken in the Sahel were around the involvement of women in security sector reform processes. During our conversation with the NDI Sahel team, it became clear that important goals of these programs are engaging women at all levels of discussion, from local organizations to the highest levels of governance, along with identifying barriers to female participation in democratic governance of the security sector processes. NDI's Sahel team expressed to us that these efforts were challenging at first due to societal norms regarding women's involvement in these processes, but that over time these barriers appeared to lessen. Tools such as gender audits were performed by NDI's partner CSOs in order to identify the current levels of gender inclusion in their programming, and to then identify additional ways in which gender could be incorporated into their security sector reform programming. These efforts led to increased female participation in various peacebuilding and reconciliation processes.

As part of our conversation with NDI's Sahel team, we also discovered that while some security sector reform policies may appear to be discriminatory from an outside perspective, their intent may be quite different. For example, in Burkina Faso, there exists an education requirement for women to join the military. On the surface, this seems like an arbitrary limitation placed on women's participation in the armed forces. However, the thought behind this policy is that if women have more education they will be more likely to advance in the military. It is this sort of policy that makes it so important for organizations such as NDI to ensure they understand the context of PSDR-related policies, but to also be prepared to explain how it may have potential adverse effects. This understanding will allow NDI to make recommendations around inclusion, while not missing the local context.

The Sahel program is still active, and the current phase, which is "focusing on supporting strategic study centers that provide analysis for policymakers, including legislators and bureaucrats," ends June 30.[142] The challenge of including marginalized groups into this process centers around the relative lack of interest in doing so from donors, who prefer broader goals of strengthening civilian capacity, as explained to us during our discussion with the NDI Sahel team. This is not to say that donors do not care about marginalized groups, but rather that their

[142] Leila Stehlik-Barry, "Main Takeaways on Peace and Security Issues in Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali," (internal NDI document, March 28, 2018).

general thought process appears to be that improving civilian capacity generally improves the situation of *all* citizens. Unfortunately, this notion ignores the fact that marginalized groups have unique needs, and programming that does not intentionally mainstream these needs will not be effective in addressing their unique situation. What follows is a set of recommendations for the NDI Sahel program aimed at helping NDI find new ways to enhance its inclusion efforts.

The Sahel Programming Recommendations

If the current program in the Sahel is extended or continued at a later date, our hope is that these recommendations will help NDI consider ways to expand the inclusion of marginalized groups in its democratic governance of the security sector programming. These recommendations could also be modified and applied to other programming in Africa or elsewhere in the world.

Recommendation #1: Language, caste, and physical location could be added in NDI's conceptualization of marginalized populations in the Sahel for an even more inclusive approach that is reflective of the regional context.

Considering the limited scholarly research on the inclusion of marginalized groups in democratic governance of the security sector, this is an area where NDI can set crucial precedents. Even actors such as the United Nations have discussed including some marginalized groups in its work in the Sahel, but not in a holistic way. In 2013, the United Nations released its "integrated strategy for the Sahel,"[143] which has not been updated since. The strategy's first goal is to enhance *inclusive* and effective governance throughout the region (italics added). Women are clearly prioritized in this goal as they are mentioned repeatedly. However, the inclusion of different political parties, youth, "minority groups," and "vulnerable groups" in governance issues is also mentioned. Regional dialogue "among traditional and community leaders and leaders of faith-based organizations," as well as "community-based conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms" are also cited as a way to combat violent extremism. Lastly, the strategy recognizes social cohesion as an area in need of improvement, and recommends participatory and inclusive dialogue as a way to support its development. The UN strategy does not specifically mention marginalization due to ethnicity, language, caste, cultural norms, or physical location -- all of which were cited by NDI's Sahel program as areas that are impeding inclusion in the Sahel. It is particularly interesting that the strategy does not reference linguistic minorities because they are a key group identified in the 1992 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities.[144] Scholars have proposed that what groups are considered marginalized can vary based on the country context and what identities are politically "relevant."[145]

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[143] United Nations, General Assembly, *United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel,* S/2013/354 (14 June 2013), https://oses.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/united_nations_integrated_strategy_for_the_sahel_s-2013-354.pdf.
[144] United Nations, General Assembly. *Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities,* A/RES/47/135 (18 December 1992), http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/47/a47r135.htm.
[145] Krook and O'Brien, 2010.

Recommendation #2: NDI could talk to donors about the importance of mainstreaming the inclusion of marginalized populations in democratic governance of the security sector processes during the goal construction phase.

There are many challenges to engaging marginalized populations in democratic governance, not least of all is the novelty of the effort. NDI's Sahel team shared with us that working with marginalized groups was not explicitly defined in the donor note/goals for the program; the donors were more interested in strengthening civilian capacity in general. This makes sense because, as noted in the literature review, the idea of democratic governance of the security sector is more than a decade old, and conversations about the inclusion of marginalized groups in this field have only begun in recent years. However, NDI should be aware that donor preferences to work "with like-minded and familiar actors who speak a common language (not only a Western language, but the language of logframes, monitoring and evaluation and due diligence), which in practice in the SSR domain tend to be implementing actors such as international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and policy- and advocacy-focused NGOs" has been cited in scholarly literature as one of four trends that threatens to undermine civil society's role in security sector reform.[146]

Recommendation #3: NDI could encourage its partner CSOs in the region to engage marginalized groups, and develop a framework to facilitate this engagement.

NDI could use its partnerships with CSOs in the region to amplify the voices of marginalized populations.[147] If civil society organizations are willing, they can assist the participation of marginalized groups "in forums with the aim of influencing state decision making [...and] in activities ranging from ad hoc public consultations to more institutionalized mechanisms for civil society input into policy processes and public administration."[148] As the security sector reform process, and specifically the democratic governance component, is quite complex, it may require technical knowledge of program design that is not common on local levels.[149] If NDI is able to identify local CSOs with program design capacity and competency, this may prove to be an entry point for marginalized groups. A local CSO that has built strong institutional capacity for advocating on behalf of a particular ethnic minority, for example, may be able to lead the process of developing security sector reform programming, even if they are not experts in the field. This would then enable these CSOs to put the needs of the marginalized group at the forefront of programmatic efforts by the virtue of their presence as a leader. In an ideal scenario, these CSOs will have been trained by NDI, thus further extending the reach of NDI's institutional values.

Recommendation #4: As a starting point for developing a strategy to engage PWDs in democratic governance of the security sector in the Sahel, refer to the UN Toolkit on Disability for Africa.

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[146] Caparini, 2010, 251.
[147] Caparini, 2010.
[148] Ibid.
[149] Liz Panarelli, "Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform," United States Institute for Peace, published February 10, 2010, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB11%20Local%20Ownership%20of%20Security%20Sector%20Reform.pdf.

In our discussion with an NDI Sahel program officer,, persons with disabilities were raised a group that was feasible for further programming efforts. In pursuit of expanding the Sahel program to include more persons with disabilities, we refer NDI to the UN Toolkit on Disability for Africa,[150] which was developed by a set of guidelines for disability inclusion while conducting development work in Africa. This toolkit gives an overview of how the UN views disability in a broad context, with its key goal being to mainstream the experiences and contributions of persons with disabilities in development efforts. These mainstreaming efforts require going beyond "adding the words 'and persons with disabilities' in various parts of policy documents,"[151] and actually "making the concerns of persons with disabilities an integral dimension of the design, implementation, and evaluation of laws, policies, and programs."[152] While not directly related to security sector reform, this toolkit offers a comprehensive look at how disability can be brought into all aspects of development in a meaningful way.

Recommendation #5: Consider contacting Afrobarometer and ask for more information about their findings in the Sahel, and perhaps partner with the organization to do more targeted polling.

In our consultation with NDI's Sahel program, distrust was discussed as a major issue between civilians and security actors in the Sahel. Literature on security sector reform in the Sahel has emphasized that a crucial measure of security sector reform progress is whether civilians feel safer and if their perception of the security sector has improved, which is inextricably tied to trust.[153] Encouragingly, civilians in the Sahel overwhelmingly say they trust the army.[154]

The organization Afrobarometer conducted public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, economic conditions in 36 African countries in recent years. The surveys are nationally representative and were conducted through face-to-face interviews in the preferred language of the respondent. Afrobarometer asked samples of 1,200 people in Burkina Faso[155], Mali[156], and Niger[157] "How much do you trust the army, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?" with possible answers being Not at all, Just a little, Somewhat, A lot, or Don't know.[158] In Burkina Faso, 50.5% of respondents answered a lot, as did 59.3% of people in Mali and 80.6% of respondents in Niger.[159]

Recommendation #6: NDI should be aware that building trust between civilians and police may prove particularly difficult in Mali. The OSCE Recommendations on Policing in Multi-Ethnic Societies may be useful in this endeavor.

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[150] United Nations, "Toolkit on Disability for Africa" (toolkit, 2016), http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/documents/disability/Toolkit/Disability-inclusive-development.pdf.
[151] Ibid.
[152] Ibid.
[153] Lisa Schirch, *Handbook on Human Security: A Civil-Military-Police Curriculum* (The Hague, The Netherlands: Alliance for Peacebuilding, GPPAC, Kroc Institute, March 2016).
[154] "The online data analysis tool," Afrobarometer, accessed April 30, 2018, http://www.afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis/analyse-online.
[155] Surveys were conducted in Burkina Faso April-May 2015.
[156] Surveys were conducted in Mali in December 2014.
[157] Surveys were conducted in Niger in April 2015.
[158] "The online data analysis tool."
[159] Ibid.

The Afrobarometer survey results were less conclusive when trust in the police was measured in the three countries. In Niger, an overwhelming 69.8% of respondents said they trusted the police a lot, compared to 48.9% in Burkina Faso and only 26.5% of people in Mali.[160] Notably, Malians were split almost evenly four ways between trusting the police a lot, somewhat, just a little, or not at all.[161] It is therefore interesting that an NDI Sahel program officer reported: "Members of parliament and CSOs from all three countries stressed during the [January 2018] forum in Bamako that local police recruited from local communities help improve relationships between state authorities and citizens living in insecure zones because, if the police are members of the community, they understand the local context and citizens have a greater trust in people they know."[162] In light of these paradoxical findings, NDI may want to do further research on the ground to get a better sense of where the disconnect is between mistrust in the police and the statements made at the Bamako forum. A place to start may be in contacting Afrobarometer and ask for more information about their findings in the Sahel, and perhaps partner with the organization to do more targeted polling.

To address distrust between civilians and police in Mali and elsewhere in the Sahel, we recommend NDI look at the OSCE Recommendations on Policing in Multi-Ethnic Societies[163] as a first step. The Recommendations were created in 2006 at a convening organized by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. Attendees of the convening were representatives from international organizations, senior police officers, independent experts, and non-governmental actors. The Recommendations are divided into six sections: general principles; recruitment and representation; training and professional support; engaging with ethnic communities; operational practices; and the prevention and management of conflict. According to the OSCE report, "The central message of the Recommendations is that good policing in multi-ethnic societies is dependent on the establishment of a relationship of trust and confidence, built on regular communication and practical co-operation, between the police and the minorities."[164] This stated central message closely aligns with NDI's emphasis on trust in democratic governance of the security sector and could thus be a useful resource.

Recommendation #7: NDI could consider focusing greater attention on strengthening the relationship between civilians and Parliament in the Sahel. AGORA, an international online database on parliamentary strengthening, may be useful in such an endeavor.

Based on Afrobarometer's findings, the trust Sahel residents have in Parliament was less encouraging than the polling on civilian trust in the army and police; 43.6% of Nigeriens, 37.6% of Burkinabes, and only 30.3% of Malians expressed "a lot" of trust in Parliament.[165] Worse yet, when asked "How much of the time do you think Members of Parliament try their best to listen to what people like you have to say?" 50.3% of Malians answered never, as did 54.8% of

[160] Ibid.
[161] Ibid.
[162] Stehlik-Barry, "Main Takeaways on Peace and Security Issues in Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali," 2018.
[163] Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, "Recommendations on Policing in Multi-Ethnic Societies" (report, The Hague, 2006), https://www.osce.org/hcnm/policing-recommendations?download=true.
[164] Ibid., 3-4.
[165] "The online data analysis tool."

Nigeriens and 57.4% of Burkinabes.[166] However, in spite of these disheartening answers, when asked whether they approved of how Members of Parliament had performed their jobs in the past year, 66.0% of Nigeriens and 65.3% of Malians said they either approved or strongly approved (Data was not provided for Burkina Faso.).[167]

The AGORA database was launched in 2010 and is headquartered at the UNDP office in Brussels, Belgium. AGORA offers resources and news updates on parliamentary development in English, French and Arabic. It also has an interactive platform where visitors can connect, interact with other members and share information. AGORA offers e-learning courses as well as trainings for parliamentarians and parliamentary staff, coordinated by the AGORA team.

Resources and Programming Tools[169]

We have developed recommendations based on the findings of our literature review and case study research, and compiled a set of resources and best practices for ways to ensure the inclusion of marginalized populations in PSDR programming broadly and as it specifically pertains to the areas of bridging intergroup divisions and democratic governance of the security sector. It should be noted that due to the relative nascency of efforts to include marginalized groups in the PSDR field, some of the tools and best practices were created for non-PSDR fields, but are mentioned in this report because we concluded that NDI can use them as a basis for programming going forward. There is a large number of relevant programs and tools, and those we highlight here are not a scientific sampling, but rather a starting point for further research.

The following tools and resources have been split into three different sections: pre-programming, during programming, and post-programming. The first section, pre-programming, has tools and resources designed to be used in the lead up to program implementation, with the goal of establishing the inclusion of marginalized groups from the onset. The second section, during programming, is designed to be used throughout the course of a program as a set of formative analysis tools to help ensure inclusion efforts are being maintained and met. Finally, the discussion closes with a set of post-programming tools and resources that can be used to evaluate the success of the program, debrief with the participants and leaders, and hopefully establish new directions and methods of inclusion, based on the success and challenges of the program.

Pre-Programming Tools

Previous research has identified analyzing a country's legislation relating to the marginalized group in question as a good starting point when looking at the relationship

[166] Ibid.
[167] Ibid.
[168] "FAQ," *AGORA,* n.d., https://www.agora-parl.org/faq.
[169] The resources featured here address democratic governance of the security sector broadly. Additional youth- and LGBTI-specific resources can be found in Appendix A.

between that group and a country's security sector.[170] Such legislation will likely codify discrimination against the group, foster their inclusion, or be nonexistent.

NDI could also consider using the research produced by different groups around UNSC Resolution 2250 on Youth, Peace, and Security. It is apparent that much like with UNSC Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security, the UN has made it clear that engaging with youth in conflict is a priority. A recent progress report[171] on UNSC 2250 made several recommendations for improving youth inclusion in post-conflict scenarios, notably including the importance of engaging youth in political process to ensure they feel their voice is heard and engaged in the process. Certainly, this evidence supports the need to involve youth in the security sector reform process, given the frequent concerns about youth involvement in violent rebel groups. Conciliation Resources has also produced a report[172] on youth and peacebuilding that was conducted by interviewing youth in numerous conflict affected areas. While the focus of that research was on the role of youth in peacebuilding, it offers another look into the needs of youth in conflict zones, again identifying the importance of involvement and education. This type of information is invaluable when developing programming for youth when it comes to either security sector reform or bridging intergroup divisions. NDI has the ability to take the work that has already been done, and use these findings in justifying the need for robust youth involvement in both security sector reform and bridging intergroup divisions programming.

Continuing along this line, traditional security sector reform tools, such as SSR Sector Mapping[173] can also be adapted to include marginalized groups. This particular tool helps identify all of the relevant security actors in a country, which can then be overlaid with a given marginalized group, to identify how this group interacts with these forces. It can identify entry points for NDI into these different sectors, to help with this inclusion process. NDI has a unique position from which it can try to ensure that marginalized populations are included in the conversation from the onset through programming. Identifying and integrating these marginalized groups is an important role for NDI to play, and using SSR Sector Mapping offers a good way to begin observing how groups interact before programming begins. While this does not mean that marginalized groups will immediately have their voices heard, it does mean that they are perceived as a legitimate part of the conversation. The use of clearly defined and easy to understand tools makes this process of inclusion a smoother one, and allows for the process to be formalized. Whether engaging in programming around bridging intergroup divisions or security sector reform, mapping how different actors interact with marginalized groups early on in the process will demonstrate the importance of their inclusion from the beginning.

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[170] Maria Otero, "Transforming Public Security in the Americas," U.S. Department of State, published May 10, 2011, https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/162948.htm; Kristin Valasek, "Security Sector Reform and Gender," in *Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit*, eds. Megan Bastick and Kristin Valasek (Geneva: DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, UN-INSTRAW, 2008), 6; Jelena Radoman, Marija Radoman, Svetlana Đurđević-Lukić, and Branka Anđelković, *LGBT People and Security Sector Reform in the Republic of Serbia* (Belgrade: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and OSCE Mission in Serbia, 2011), 9, http://www.publicpolicy.rs/publikacije/cddd7a3f395d923e21a917e70d457cb32ce539c9.pdf.

[171] United Nations, General Assembly, *The missing peace: independent progress study on youth and peace and security,* A/72/761 and S/2018/86 (2 March 2014), https://undocs.org/en/S/2018/86.

[172] Conciliation Resources, "Youth aspirations for peace and security" (report, London, 2018), https://www.osce.org/fsc/41355.

[173] Swedish Contact Group, "Security Sector Reform Assessment Framework," (Framework, Stockholm, Sweden, 2007), https://issat.dcaf.ch/download/4345/38221/FBA%20-%20SSR%20Assessment%20Framework.pdf.

Tools During Programming

NDI may also want to consider taking existing conflict analysis tools, such as those produced by the Center for Security Studies,[174] and adapting them to analyze the needs and fears of marginalized groups. As many of these tools come from ongoing conflict analyses, with names like "Needs-Fears Mapping,"[175] it seems prudent for NDI to develop internal language for that is less threatening. Tools such as "Needs-Fear Mapping" (see Figure 1) provide a useful template for NDI to begin conversations about what different marginalized groups need from the security sector reform process. These conversations should be conducted with representatives of these different groups present, or NDI can solicit input from local CSOs. In the "Needs-Fear Mapping" tool, for example, each actor writes their specific needs and concerns, and then a group exercise is conducted in which the actors write down what they feel the other actors' needs and concerns are. While the goal is to have direct input from marginalized groups themselves, this may not be immediately feasible, which would make the exercise of role-playing marginalized groups the next best option. Powerful groups may not have the best grasp of the needs of marginalized groups, so giving them a template to begin discussing these needs is a good way to begin.

When it comes to bridging intergroup divisions, it may even be possible to bring groups together to think about how other groups perceive themselves and the other "out" groups. This sort of process must be carried out with caution to avoid stoking further tensions or reinforcing stereotypes, but the potential exists for groups to develop a meaningful understanding of each other's needs and fears. This type of straightforward charting exercise may help break down barriers between groups, and even find common ground around needs and fears.

Figure 1. Needs-Fear Map

Parties	Issues	Interest/Needs	Fears	Means	Options

Post-Programming Tools

Additionally, many tools already exist to monitor how inclusive the security sector reform process has been toward gender.[176] Rather than reinvent the wheel, NDI should look at how

[174]Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, "Conflict Analysis Tools" (tip sheet, Switzerland, 2005), http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/Conflict-Analysis-Tools.pdf.
[175]Ibid.
[176]Karen Barnes, and Peter Albrecht. Civil Society Oversight of the Security Sector and Gender: Toolkit 9, in *Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit*, eds. Megan Bastick and Kristin Valasek (Geneva: DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, UN-INSTRAW, 2008). https://bit.ly/2wc4OMc.

gender audits, and other tools like it, can be adapted to assess how the needs of other marginalized groups are being met, such as LGBTI persons, or people with disabilities. While this may seem like a simple process, it will require convincing key stakeholders of the importance of these audits, which may require incentivizing the audits in some way, and also convincing local partners of the importance of including these marginalized groups in the security sector reform process. When this process is framed as democratic governance of the security sector, NDI can lean on its commitment to including marginalized groups in the democratic process, which requires all voices to be heard. As with gender audits, the "auditor" should be a local expert who is in tune with the needs of the group they represent, whether it is an ethnic or religious minority, indigenous group, youth group, LGBTI group, or PWD group. This particular tool should be helpful to NDI given the vast amount of experience NDI has in gender programming. Finding ways to use NDI's strengths to incorporate these other marginalized groups should make the process smoother on an operational level.

Conclusion

Despite constituting two separate fields, there is significant overlap between bridging intergroup divisions and democratic governance of the security sector. As such, there are lessons that can be shared between the two based on research and programming that has been conducted in both fields. In particular, NDI can likely draw on the more developed field of intergroup divisions for questions related to democratic governance of the security sector. For both areas, however, there is a lack of literature and programming that specifically addresses marginalized populations. The importance of involving marginalized groups in conflict resolution processes is widely recognized among scholars and practitioners, but focused research and programming remain scarce. This deficiency should be seen as an opportunity, rather than a limitation, for NDI to break new ground.

Taking the lead on engaging marginalized populations in attempts to bridge intergroup divisions and foster democratic governance of the security sector will likely require creativity and flexibility in programming efforts, but can result in unique and innovative programs. In much of our own research we had to use experimental search terms and borrow resources developed for other fields in an attempt to fill scholarly and programming gaps. In light of this, we encourage NDI to interpret our broad findings through their various lenses of expertise.

Across the three case studies, CAR, BiH, and the Sahel, several trends emerged with regard to the inclusion of marginalized groups. The difficulty of accessing these groups was noted, particularly in the Sahel and CAR, which led us to make recommendations that are aimed at engaging NDI's partners in these countries, who may be better equipped with resources and manpower to identify these groups. NDI has the ability to encourage their partners to rethink how they engage with marginalized groups, and the resources and recommendations in this report will hopefully with this process.

Moving forward, NDI may need to consider how the urban/rural divide affects marginalized groups in many countries. This was an issue in both the Sahel and CAR case studies, with access to rural populations constituting a major programmatic challenge. This is because rural populations are often also part of marginalized groups, usually ethnic or religious, or are marginalized primarily because of their location. These people may also have different

needs due to their remote location. NDI should continue efforts to mainstream marginalized groups into programming when feasible, and then evaluate this programming to determine how it can be improved and applied to different contexts and programs.

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Appendix A

Resources specific to certain marginalized groups

LGBTI-specific resources

1. Advancing the Human Rights and Inclusion of LGBTI People: A Handbook for Parliamentarians
    a. http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-governance/parliamentary_development/advancing-the-human-rights-and-inclusion-of-lgbti-people--a-hand.html
    b. "This Handbook sets out relevant human rights frameworks and highlights the role of parliamentarians in implementing Agenda 2030, to ensure no one, including LGBTI people, is left behind. It offers practical tips, tools and resources designed to support parliamentarians to undertake legislative, representational and oversight activities that advance the rights and inclusion of LGBTI people."
2. SOGI Legislative Database
    a. https://www.icj.org/sogi-legislative-database/
    b. "The SOGI Legislative Database is a collection of laws covering issues of concern to LGBT[I] individuals and communities around the world."
3. Meaker, Morgan. *'The LGBT community is invisible': using data to fight hate crime in the Balkans.* The Guardian, 2016.
    a. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2016/mar/30/scared-come-out-lgbt-kosovo-serbia-bosnia-hate-crime
4. Human Rights Watch, 2014
    a. Bosnia and Herzegovina: Attack on LGBT Activists
    b. https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/02/04/bosnia-and-herzegovina-attack-lgbt-activists

Youth-specific resource

1. Conflict management and peace building in everyday life: A resource kit for children and youth
    a. https://www.reddbarna.no/Media/dokumenter/ResourceKit-web.pdf
    b. The advocacy and campaign work of Save the Children Norway "addresses the rights of the poorest and most marginalized children and towards Governments to close the opportunity gaps and ensure equitable progress and outcomes for children." In 2015, they produced this comprehensive "resource kit" on involving youth in conflict management and peacebuilding, which provides both analytic tools for examining how conflict affects youth, while also offering concrete examples of activities to help young people learn about conflicts, and build skills around communication and being active citizens. NDI should be able to adapt many of the tools and initiatives here to meet the specific needs of different NDI programs, and even perhaps to other marginalized groups.

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Appendix B

Further Reading on Theories of Intergroup Conflict

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Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. *Mediation and Dialogue Facilitation in the OSCE: Reference Guide.* OSCE Conflict Prevention Center. https://www.osce.org/secretariat/126646?download=true

OSCE. *Hate Crime Laws: A Practical Guide.* Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. https://www.osce.org/odihr/36426?download=true

OSCE Roma Policing Manual. *Contact Point for Roma and Sinti Issues.* Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. https://www.osce.org/odihr/21615?download=true

Further General Reading on Intergroup Conflict

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Appendix C

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